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KEEPING IT UNDER WRAPS: TRADE SECRECY FOR 
OFFSHORE ASSET PROTECTION PLANS 
THOMAS A. BRUNTY, J.D. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION: THE BASICS OF THE ASSET PROTECTION 
PLANNING INDUSTRY 
The potential loss of assets through creditor actions and judicial at-
tachment is a matter of grave concern to many businesses and wealthy in-
dividuals.  These individuals fear that excessive, unjust, or otherwise 
improper creditor claims and judicial actions have the potential to wreak 
financial havoc or ruin upon their businesses and/or strip their private in-
vestment portfolios of their value.1  Some analysts believe that venal credi-
tor claims have become a chronic, severe problem within the American 
legal system.  These analysts feel that anyone with a substantial asset port-
folio is a fit target to be dragged into court for almost any cause, such as 
professional malpractice, officers’ and directors’ liability, automobile acci-
dent liability, home owner’s liability, divorce, and others.2  Some contend 
that this situation has become so frightful that at present, “predatory litiga-
tion haunts the dreams of every thinking professional.”3 
This concern is widespread, and has spawned a considerable industry 
in the field of asset protection planning.4  This field occupies a somewhat 
unique milieu, having essentially evolved as a distinct taxon under the 
broader rubrics of financial and organizational planning.  It is defined by 
the efforts of asset protection planners (“Planners”) who have come to spe-
cialize in the development of legal plans and strategies to reduce their cli-
ents’ exposure to capital risks arising from taxation or creditor actions.5  
Practices may vary widely within the industry, and substantial disagree-
 
 1.  James T. Lorenzetti, The Offshore Trust: A Contemporary Asset Protection Scheme, 102 
COM. L.J. 138, 138 (1997). 
 2.  Id.; see also Jonathan L. Mezrich, It’s Better in the Bahamas: Asset Protection Trusts for the 
Pennsylvania Lawyer, 98 DICK. L. REV. 657, 657 n.2 (1993). 
 3.  F. BENTLEY MOONEY, JR., CREATING & PRESERVING WEALTH, i–ii (Probus Publishing Co. 
1991). 
 4.  See JAMES S. HENRY, TAX JUSTICE NETWORK, THE PRICE OF OFFSHORE REVISITED 5 (2012), 
available at http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Price_of_Offshore_Revisited_120722.pdf. 
 5.  See id. at 13 (full review of the scope of these activities at the institutional level). 
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ment exists as to the most suitable means of achieving the optimal ends of 
asset protection.  Even a matter so seemingly basic and fundamental as the 
selection of proper types of legal entities can be a matter of heated polem-
ics and debate.6  Thus, while all Planners presumably pursue the same 
goals, there is no single method recognized as the most appropriate means 
of achieving them. 
Opinions differ widely as to what constitutes the optimal measures to 
protect assets effectively, or what the most specifically advantageous 
methods of deploying those measures may be.  In crafting particular sets of 
methods, models, and procedures that best reify their ideas, Planners devel-
op a unique expression of intellectual processes that some may wish to 
protect as intellectual property (IP).  This gives rise to a number of im-
portant questions, including: If asset protection plans and models constitute 
IP, what is the best means of achieving their protection?  Though not tradi-
tionally considered applicable to advisory enterprises, might trade secrecy 
be used effectively to protect asset protection plans? 
A number of elements and industry characteristics suggest the ap-
plicability of trade secrecy to processes and proceeds of asset protection 
planning.  Planners are extremely sensitive to consumer perception of their 
market.  Experts in this field often go to great lengths in order to create and 
preserve a perceived store of uniquely enhanced value, or cachet, in their 
services. It is this singular quality that gives asset protection plans their 
substantial economic value, justifying the often considerable expense that 
clients pay for planning services. To enhance this perception, and preserve 
its attendant value, Planners often make overt efforts to keep their planning 
models confidential.  They may provide only generalized descriptions of 
their plans and the associated benefits they offer to prospective clients, 
while making more detailed information available only upon personal con-
sultation.7 
Such protective measures are consistent with the treatment of the in-
formation contained in asset protection planning documents as trade se-
crets.  These measures seem to reflect a recognized need to preserve a 
corpus of economic value borne of the singular skills and creativity neces-
sary to produce an effective asset protection plan.  They exhibit a number 
of the recognizable hallmarks and indicia of trade secrets, and arguably 
 
 6.  Ritchie W. Taylor, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: The “Estate Planning Tool of the 
Decade” or a Charlatan?, 13 BYU J. PUB. L. 163, 166–68 (1998); Lin Hanson, Don’t Use 
an LLC for Asset Protection - Here Are Ways a Creditor Can Pry Open an LLC to Get at a Member-
Debtor’s Personal Assets, 96 ILL. B.J. 314, 314 (2008). 
 7.  JEFFREY H. CORBETT & PATRICK J. KISH, BEHIND THE OFFSHORE VEIL passim (Worldwide 
Business Consultants, Inc. 1998). 
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provide a basis upon which these plans may be afforded trade secret protec-
tion. 
Based on these and other factors, a tentative hypothesis emerges that 
the documentary forms, terms, and operative instructions contained in off-
shore asset protection plans may be developed and kept as trade secrets.  
The present article examines the potential viability of claiming trade secre-
cy as a means of protecting such plans, including not only their content but 
also the techniques and processes used in their development.  It briefly 
surveys the characteristic features and issues attendant to trade secrets gen-
erally, and discusses the possible modes in which the standards and ele-
mental treatments normally governing trade secret protection may be 
applied to asset protection planning.  For reasons stated, infra, the present 
analysis gives a special emphasis and address to a specific subset of asset 
protection plans involving the use of Foreign Asset Protection Trusts 
(FAPTs).  While acknowledging that the extension of trade secret protec-
tion to FAPT plans may be problematic in some respects, this treatment 
will show that trade secret claims offer a potentially viable means by which 
Planners may protect the proprietary content of the organizational models 
they create, or at least assert colorable claims of a legally protected interest. 
The present analysis proceeds on the following assumptions: 
1. the Planner requires prospective clients to sign non-disclosure 
agreements in order to obtain specific information regarding a 
plan or planning model;8 
2. these non-disclosure agreements closely restrict the dissemi-
nation of plan contents to the prospective client, and to any 
independent professionals with whom that client wishes to 
consult on strictly a need-to-know basis;9 and 
3. any detailed plans provided to these clients bear conspicuous 
captions identifying the subject material as private, proprie-
tary, and/or confidential. 
 
 8.  Such agreements are used by a variety of offshore planners.  See Tax Havens and Tax Admin-
istration: Arrangements we are concerned about, AUSTRALIAN TAXATION OFFICE (Oct. 18, 2011), 
https://www.ato.gov.au/Business/International-tax-for-businesses/Previous-years/Investing-
overseas/Tax-havens-and-tax-administration/?page=8#Arrangements_we_are_concerned_about ; Black 
Holes & UFOs, QUATLOOS!, http://www.quatloos.com/taxscams/blackhol.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 
2014). 
 9.  QUATLOOS!, supra note 8; Ike Devji, Physicians Facing Increased Risk as Investment Fraud 
Targets, PHYSICIANS PRACTICE (Feb. 15, 2011),  http://www.physicianspractice.com/blog/physicians-
facing-increased-risk-investment-fraud-targets. 
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II.  THE FUNDAMENTALS OF ASSET PROTECTION PLANNING: 
STRATEGIES, PRINCIPLES, AND PRECEPTS 
The most essential feature of asset protection plans is that they gener-
ally operate on principles of compartmentalization and limitation of liabil-
ity.10  The premise underlying this is that one may freely transfer assets into 
a separate entity for which the transferor has no associated liability (or at 
least none that would exceed the value of the transferred assets), with the 
result that whatever income or liabilities arise from those assets will belong 
to the transferee alone.11  Once legal title has been safely conveyed to the 
transferee, creditors may be told they are no longer capable of reaching 
those assets, simply because they no longer belong to the transferor.  The 
act of transference thus cleans out the transferor’s cupboard, so to speak, so 
that any creditors who come knocking at the transferor’s door afterward 
will simply go away hungry and disappointed.12  This essential premise is 
informed by a rather basic axiom: creditors and tax authorities can neither 
seize nor tax from a debtor what the debtor does not own or control. 
Among the more common entity types used to achieve this end are 
conventional statutory trusts, limited partnerships, limited liability compa-
nies (“LLCs”), and corporations.13  Alternative and somewhat more con-
troversial forms are those based in offshore jurisdictions, including 
dedicated FAPTs14 and various species of foreign “common law trust or-
ganizations.”15  The attributes and effects of these entity forms can differ 
dramatically, and they often must be deployed in complex and complemen-
tary arrays in order to achieve the precise results that advisors and their 
clients desire.16  Thus, while these entity forms may themselves be relative-
 
 10.  Christopher M. Riser, Asset Protection Basics: Using Partnerships and LLCS, 24 No. 1 
PRAC. REAL EST. LAW. 27, 38–39 (2008); Julia Gold, Series Limited Liability Companies — Too Good 
To Be True?, 12 NEV. LAW. 18, 19 (2004). 
 11.  PETER SPERO, ASSET PROTECTION: LEGAL PLANNING, STRATEGIES AND FORMS, ¶ 8.01 
Thomson/RIA  (Supp. 2012). 
 12.  Jay Adkisson, Ten Rules for Asset Protection Planning, FORBES (Jul. 13, 2011), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jayadkisson/2011/07/13/ten-rules-for-asset-protection-planning/ (illustrat-
ing this concept with a “chips and table” analogy). 
 13.  DUNCAN E. OSBORNE & ELIZABETH MORGAN SCHURIG, ASSET PROTECTION: DOMESTIC AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TACTICS § 17:10, pt. 2 (2012), available at Westlaw; DARRELL AVISS & 
LARRY CHAMBERS, STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING WEALTH 36 (McGraw-Hill Professional 2006); 
Taylor, supra note 6, at 164. 
 14.  RICHARD C. LAWRENCE & CHRISTINA M. BALTZ, Foreign Trusts and Alternative Vehicle, 
A.L.I.-A.B.A. Continuing Legal Education (2003); Richard C. Ausness The Offshore Asset Protection 
Trust: A Prudent Financial Planning Device or the Last Refuge of a Scoundrel?, 45 DUQ. L. REV. 147, 
189 (2007). 
 15.  See FREDERICK H. MILLER & NEIL B. COHEN, SECURED TRANSACTIONS 9A HAWKLAND UCC 
SERIES § 9–102:19 [Rev]; Smith v. Anderson, (1880) L.R. 15 Ch.D. 247 (for common law trust organi-
zations generally). 
 16.  See e.g. THOMAS AZZARA, TAX HAVENS OF THE WORLD, passim (Tax Haven Reporter, 8th 
ed. 2003). 
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ly well known within the standard repertoire of asset protection tools, the 
optimal means and modi of adopting and/or utilizing them often are not. 
The distinction between onshore and offshore strategies comprises one 
of the key divisions found within the taxonomy of asset protection plan-
ning.17  Onshore planning is generally perceived as far more conventional 
than its offshore counterpart (with the possible exception of the use of do-
mestic asset protection trusts18), and typically involves greater use of cor-
porations, various forms of partnership, and LLCs than offshore planning 
does.19  Alternatively, offshore planning frequently involves the expansive 
use of purpose-built trusts, specifically formed to achieve added benefits of 
extra-territoriality and the special protections afforded under adverse legal 
systems.20  This generally requires a Planner to possess a high level of ex-
pertise encompassing exotic, adventitious legal systems, largely removed 
from and in some instances practically inscrutable to domestic observers.21  
All of this appears to make FAPT planning models more naturally suscep-
tible to trade secret protection than onshore planning models might be.  For 
these and other reasons (including economy of analysis), this article will 
specifically focus on FAPT planning (“Planning”). 
III.  ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING A TRADE SECRET: THE 
ELEMENTAL REQUIREMENTS 
The precise character of what may constitute a trade secret is not a 
subject of ready or finite delimitation.  No exact definition of a trade secret 
is available, making it necessary to define the essential constitution of any 
specific trade secret by a set of broad, subjectively (and often relatively) 
interpreted characteristics.22  The determinative weight of these characteris-
tics, in turn, varies somewhat depending upon the authority consulted.  The 
 
 17.  This distinction may sometimes appear arbitrary, in that asset protection plans often integrate 
both onshore and offshore elements into a single, comprehensive scheme of protections and operations.  
See Taylor, supra note 6, at 183.  
 18.  See John A. Warnick & Sergio Pareja, Selecting a Trust Situs in the 21st Century, 16 Prob. & 
Prop. 53, 55 (2002). 
 19.  See Taylor, supra note 6, at 165. 
 20.  These may include requirements for statutory comity, de novo proceedings for the establish-
ment of claims, enhanced judicial burdens upon creditors, judgment caps, and others.  Id. at 169–75; 
JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40623, TAX HAVENS: INTERNATIONAL TAX 
AVOIDANCE AND EVASION, at 9 (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40623.pdf; U.S. 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE OFFSHORE ASSET PROTECTION TRUST, 
http://www.uschambersmallbusinessnation.com/toolkits/guide/P12_3815; ROBERT LAMBERT, ASSET 
PROTECTION SEMINAR: 10 SESSION 13–15 (Trustmakers LLC 2007).   
 21.  David B. Mandell & Jason M. O’Dell, Offshore Asset Protection, PHYSICIAN’S MONEY 
DIGEST (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.physiciansmoneydigest.com/personal-finance/Offshore-Asset-
Protection. 
 22.  See e.g., Tony Mason v. Jack Daniel Distillery, 518 So. 2d 130, 132–33 (Ala. Civ. App. 
1987). 
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primary governance of trade secrets in the United States is found in the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), which defines a trade secret as: 
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, 
or process, that: 
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known 
to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain eco-
nomic value from its disclosure or use, and 
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secre-
cy.23 
Since localized versions of the UTSA have been adopted as governing 
law by forty-seven states (plus the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and 
the U.S. Virgin Islands),24 its basic definition enjoys the weight of statute in 
most state judicial systems.25  This gives the UTSA the broadest sway in 
determining the constitution of trade secrets within domestic jurisprudence, 
since trade secret interests and their attendant causes of action are governed 
by state law, and at present are not covered under any federal statute.26  
Some jurisdictions, however, continue to subscribe to other authorities, and 
may use other primary definitions accordingly.27 
Besides (and in some respects, as a complement to) the UTSA, other 
authorities also bear upon the legal status and definition of trade secret.  
Perhaps the most influential and persuasive of these are the Restatements 
that specifically address trade secret jurisprudence.  The Restatement of 
Torts contains commentary defining a trade secret as “any formula, pattern, 
device or compilation of information which is used in one’s business, and 
which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors 
who do not know or use it.”28 This highlights the so-called “Use Require-
ment” imparted by the Restatement’s definition.29  This commentary goes 
 
 23.  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985). 
 24.  Trade Secrets Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION (2014), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Trade%20Secrets%20Act. 
 25.  There is some variance among the individual state versions of the UTSA.  Not all states have 
adopted the same version of the UTSA, with some opting for the 1979 version and others the amended 
1985 version. United States of America Uniform Trade Secrets Act, model law, as amended in 1985, 
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=3934 (last visited Nov. 2, 2014). Some states have also 
modified the text of the act to accommodate local common law values and precepts, as well as other 
conventions. 
 26.  Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
427, 429 (1995). 
 27.  MICHAEL H. BUNIS & ANITA SPIETH, COMMON LAW V. UTSA: THE LAST STATES STANDING 
1 (2012), available at http://www.choate.com/uploads/113/doc/bunis-spieth-law360-common-law-v-
utsa-the-last-states-standing.pdf (The authors treat Texas as a “holdout state,” but Texas adopted the 
UTSA after this source was published). 
 28.  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) (emphasis added).  
 29.  Two of the remaining “holdout” states that continue to utilize common law definitions (i.e. 
Massachusetts and New York, with Texas having adopted the UTSA in May 2013), actually extend this 
requirement to “continuous use.” BUNIS, supra note 27, at 2.  
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on to enumerate a number of pertinent factors that further aid in the defini-
tion of a trade secret, including: 
1. the extent to which the information is known outside of a 
claimant’s business; 
2. the extent to which it is known by employees and others in-
volved in the claimant’s business; 
3. the extent of measures taken by the claimant to guard the se-
crecy of the information; 
4. the value of the information to the claimant and to the claim-
ant’s competitors; 
5. the amount of effort or money expended by the claimant in 
developing the information; and, 
6. the ease or difficulty with which the information could be 
properly acquired or duplicated by others.30 
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition also provides a defini-
tion of trade secrets, which, in contrast to the more fulsome definitions 
found in the USTA and Restatement of Torts’ commentary, is a model of 
brevity.  This Restatement defines a trade secret merely as “any infor-
mation that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise 
and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential 
economic advantage over others.”31  The terseness of this statement con-
veys not just a pronounced economy of language, but through its omission 
of the more delimiting terms found in preceding authorities it also imputes 
a wider breadth and latitude to its meaning.  As such, the Restatement 
(Third) of Unfair Competition is interpreted as following the USTA’s pur-
poseful tendenz toward substantially expanding the scope of coverage be-
yond that of the Restatement of Torts.32  Its definition effectively includes 
all information of any economic value as a potential trade secret,33 and 
seemingly encompasses information that may have fallen beyond even the 
definitional scope of the UTSA.34  Resultantly, the Restatement (Third) of 
Unfair Competition seems to provide the broadest avenues of inclusion by 
 
 30.   RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. B. 
 31.  RESTATEMENT THIRD OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995). 
 32.  Edmund W. Kitch, The Expansion of Trade Secret Protection and the Mobility of Manage-
ment Employees: A New Problem for the Law, 47 S.C. L. REV. 659–64 (1996). 
 33.  Id. at 662. 
 34.  See id. at 662–64 (explaining that The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition is broadly 
viewed as an accommodation of the protective mandates found in Article 39 of the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, with its formulation comprising a significant and obligatory step toward TRIPS compliance).  
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which offshore asset protection plans and other unusual stores of proprie-
tary value may be regarded as trade secrets.35 
As noted before, the Restatements often comprise complementary au-
thority to that of the UTSA.  Even in states that have adopted the UTSA, 
courts frequently refer to the Restatements for insight and guidelines re-
garding the application of their statutes to the particular facts and circum-
stances of cases before them.36  This suggests that a sound, comprehensive 
determination of applicable trade secret protections may only be made by 
treating the UTSA and Restatements together in an expansive definitional 
matrix.  To this end, offshore asset protection plans, like any body of pur-
portedly confidential information, should satisfy a substantial number of 
the enumerations found within this collective if they are to receive substan-
tial protection as trade secrets. 
The common denominator among the UTSA and the Restatement 
(Third) of Unfair Competition is that they both define a trade secret as a 
body of information, and information comprises the essence of a Planning 
model.  The definition found in the Restatement of Torts is somewhat more 
problematic, however, in that it requires a trade secret to comprise “a for-
mula, pattern, device or compilation of information,” not just a body of 
information itself.37  Since the whole premise upon which a Planning model 
may be considered a trade secret is that it departs from the mere compila-
tion of information, it may be internally inconsistent and self-defeating for 
a Planner to attempt to label her proprietary plans as compilations. 
Under a Restatement of Torts mode of analysis, then, the critical issue 
relative to FAPT Plans would likely be whether they comprise or contain a 
formula or pattern.  Insofar as these Plans implement patterned, integrated 
schemes or formulations that prescribe the interaction between a set of 
operative procedures and formational elements, a claimant may plausibly 
assert that an FAPT Plan satisfies the Restatement’s criterion as a formula.  
Thus, just as with the UTSA and Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competi-
tion, the substance of an FAPT Plan may satisfy the Restatement of Torts’ 
basic subject matter requirement for trade secrets. 
 
 35.  RESTATEMENT THIRD OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 44–45 (expanding the prescribed scope of 
injunctive relief and other remedies available to those who claim misappropriation of their trade se-
crets).  
 36.  See, e.g., Gary Van Zeeland Talent, Inc. v. Sandas, 84 Wis. 2d 202 (Wis. 1978). 
 37.  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) (emphasis added). 
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A. Reasonable Steps to Maintain Confidentiality and the Conference 
of Economic Advantage 
The efforts toward confidentiality outlined in the Introduction and 
statement of assumptions would appear to constitute reasonable steps and 
efforts to maintain secrecy as required by both the UTSA and the Restate-
ment of Torts.  The use of captions (or “legends”) identifying material as 
confidential has particularly been recognized as a reasonable means of 
preserving the confidentiality of specialized commercial information, even 
after its limited publication and/or distribution.38  Such captions provide 
notice of the confidential nature of a Plan’s content to all recipients, and 
establish the framework of the confidential relationship underlying the 
documents’ release.39 
The enhanced marketing potential conferred by the confidentiality of a 
Planner’s work also appears to satisfy the economic advantage prongs 
within the requirements of the USTA and the Restatements.  The entire 
basis for the economic value of a Planner’s work lies in that the organiza-
tional Plans she produces are not commonly known, and ostensibly provide 
a unique set of economic protections and benefits to her clients.  The ar-
cane rarity of the expertise necessary to produce a well-developed Plan 
justifies the high premium in provender that clients are willing to yield to a 
Planner.  Thus, the Planner derives a direct, substantive economic ad-
vantage from her ability to preserve the confidential nature of the infor-
mation she offers. 
B. Rarity of Expertise – Distinguishing FAPT Planning Models from 
Common Industry Knowledge 
As noted previously, Planners diverge in their assessment of the most 
advantageous strategies, techniques, and specific organizational structures 
to be used in the development and implementation of offshore Plans.  Plan-
ners offer highly varied services, and they often take elaborate steps to 
promote the special features and benefits of particular Plans to clients, em-
phasizing the unique store of value that they provide.  The more ambitious 
among them may even brand their individual Planning models, giving them 
catchy names or trademarks designed to convey concurrent airs of distinc-
tion and broad acceptance.40  Within the fiercely competitive environment 
 
 38.  See Data General Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, Inc., 357 A.2d 105, 109, 111 (Del. Ch. 
1975). 
 39.  See id. 
 40.  Examples include Scrantom, Kleinfeld, and Jeeves’ Pegasus Plan and Mark Chappell’s 
Contractual Company model (see infra, note 45); the Wealth Preservation Fortress, 
http://www.wealthpreservationfortress.com/wpf.shtml. 
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of their industry, Planners are quick to point out apparent deficiencies in 
competitors’ offerings while ardently promoting the advantages of their 
own.41 
Planners generally have a distinct vision of the best manner in which 
to achieve optimal protection of their clients’ assets and interests, and the 
content of their Plans reflects these unique perspectives.  While inherent 
novelty or uniqueness is not an essential element of a trade secret,42 a trade 
secret must possess at least a modicum of originality that separates it from 
the common knowledge of its industry.43  Thus, the rarity of the expertise 
underlying FAPT Plans and the novelty that extends to the Plans them-
selves become pertinent factors in assessing claims of trade secrecy. 
By its very essence, proper Planning does not comprise a simple pro-
cess of compiling readily available data and information known throughout 
the industry.  If it did, then logically the work product of the blandest, least 
discerning mind would be of essentially the same quality as that of the best 
and brightest in the field.  If this were the case, it would not really matter 
whose Plan a client might choose to implement.  Rather, the art of Planning 
is one of refinement, by which effective models are distilled from an over-
whelming welter of information through the discreet, expert application of 
select principles.  Ideally, this results in a Planning model of unique quali-
ty; one that can be tailored to the needs of a class of clients to render their 
assets as safe and secure as possible. 
The process underlying these models requires a Planner to choose 
from a myriad of available options and then interweave them into a design 
fashioned with attention to the peculiar needs of a select group of clients.  
The Planner must be able to integrate a variety of techniques, such as mul-
ti-jurisdictional formations and/or tiering, compartmentalization of equities, 
repository and depository sequences, sequences of mixed entity types, and 
others.44  Often, the solutions encoded in FAPT Plans are wholly the prod-
ucts of extrapolation from legal precepts, principles, and theories found in 
diverse legal systems, and may feature organizational structures and 
 
 41.  See, e.g., Mooney, supra note 3, 98–104. 
 42.  Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d, 1971 LEXIS 7272, 621, 624 (7th Cir. 
1971) (applying Wisconsin law) (citing Cataphote Corporation v. Cecil W. Hudson and Hudson Indus-
tries Inc., 422 F.2d 1313, 1315 (5th Cir. 1971)). 
 43.  Id., available at Cataphote Corporation v. Hudson, 444 F.2d 1313, 1315 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 44.  Sebastian R. Gibson, Offshore Asset Protection, AVVO, (2011), http://www.avvo.com/legal-
guides/ugc/offshore-asset-protection.; Dave Robertson, Privae Trust Banking-21st Century Offshore 
Banking, ESCAPE ARTIST, Jan. 26, 2012, http://assetprotection.escapeartist.com/private-trust-offshore-
banking/.; OFFSHORE ASSET PROTECTION STRUCTURES, http://www.sterlingoffshore.com/about-
offshore/asset-protection.html (last visited Nov.13, 2014). 
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claimed entity types rarely seen in the United States.45  Just as often, the 
unique value within a Plan derives from a Planner’s specific techniques for 
crafting cooperative agreements and affiliations with offshore trust compa-
nies, which are categorically distinct from general industry knowledge.46  
Even the choice of domiciliary jurisdictions comprises a critical variable, 
for jurisdictional laws and procedures that may work optimally for one 
Planning approach may be directly antagonistic to another.47 
As this indicates, effective Planning does not comport with any stand-
ardized methods or models.  Instead, effective Planning processes deploy 
highly individualized formulations based on sophisticated legal and finan-
cial principles.  Planning models must be specifically formulated to achieve 
a precise, complementary balance between disparate elements, distilled 
from a particularized blend of knowledge and cumulative, often experien-
tially acquired, expertise.  One size does not fit all, and this places Planning 
models beyond the domain of standard industry knowledge, and within the 
more exclusive realm of proprietary information. 
C. The (Un)Ease of Replicability 
The issues of novelty and rarity partially overlap that of non-
replicability, for the former somewhat portend and produce the latter.  The 
rarity of their predicating knowledge and expertise, along with their highly 
distinctive and individualized character, makes Planning models difficult to 
replicate by fair and legitimate means.  These models must be crafted to 
allow clients to negotiate a veritable legal minefield, striking a delicate 
balance between legal risk and pecuniary security and reward.  The nature 
of the potential pitfalls and liabilities that an FAPT Plan must neutralize are 
such that a fully integrated plan may be extremely difficult to reverse-
engineer merely by observing its effects.  These issues include problems of 
situs law, scope of entrustment, title characterization, and arm’s length 
transactions and self-dealing.48 
 
 45. , ST. VINCENT’S TRADITION AS AN OFFSHORE CENTRE, 
http://www.mondaq.com/x/7381/offshore+financial+centres/Legislation+and+Developments, (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2014) (discussing the Pegasus corporate/trust hybrid; MARK CHAPPEL, SECRETS 
OF OFFSHORE TAX HAVENS (ABM Publishing Co.1985), for a discussion of the Contractual 
Company, a proprietary form of a common law trust organization. 
 46.  Grant Morris Dodds, Offshore Trusts, http://www.gmdlegal.com/offshore-trusts/ (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2014). 
 47.  Compare EscapeArtist.com, Why You Should Favor Offshore Jurisdictions without Tax 
Information Exchange Agreements, http://www.escapeartist.com/OREQ21/Asset_Protection.html; with 
PanamaLaw.us, Offshore Jurisdiction Comparison, 
http://www.panamalaw.us/offshore_jurisdiction_comparison.html#sthash (both last visited Apr. 28, 
2014).  
 48.  See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission v. Affordable Media LLC, 179 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 
1999); 
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Judicial treatment of the terms commonly found in FAPT indentures 
amply illustrates the nature and overlapping extent of these problems.49  
Courts have roundly expressed concern regarding these terms, and have 
frequently addressed them by applying painful sanctions and remedies 
against FAPT principals and beneficiaries.50  Certain key structural ele-
ments, routinely endorsed and sanctioned by the statutes and/or common 
law of FAPT domiciliary jurisdictions,51 sharply distinguish FAPT inden-
tures from those of other, more basic and conventional trust types.  These 
elements express a novel conception of trust law, one which appears in 
conflict with a number of basic tenets of domestic trust jurisprudence. The 
most notable among these are:52 
1. self-settlement, the process by which the same, single party or 
person who settles and funds the trust also becomes its benefi-
ciary;53 
2. a co-trustee provision, whereby the settlor/beneficiary is also 
named co-trustee to supervise the trust alongside of a foreign 
“primary” trustee;54 
3. a discretionary clause, which establishes the trustees’ authori-
ty to grant or withhold distributions from any beneficiary or 
all beneficiaries, or to make unequal distributions among any 
or all beneficiaries, or to sell, liquidate, or otherwise dispose 
of the trust’s corpus at the trustee’s sole discretion;55 
4. a form of anti-alienation clause, stating that the benefi-
ciar(y)(ies) cannot transfer, assign, hypothecate, pledge, or 
otherwise dispose of the beneficial interest to a third party, nor 
 
In re Brown, (Bankr. Alaska 1996), available at 
http://www.assetprotectioncorp.com/forums/ubbthreads.php/topics/6097/Choice_of_Law_In_re_Brown
.; In re Portnoy, 201 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996); In re B.V. Brooks, 217 B.R. 98 (Bankr. D. 
Conn. 1998), available at http://chapter11cases.com/2012/07/01/in-re-brooks-217-br-98-bankr-court-d-
connecticut-1998/. 
 49.  See id. 
 50.  See id. 
 51.  AMY M. HESS, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES: A TREATISE COVERING THE LAW 
RELATING TO TRUSTS AND ALLIED SUBJECTS AFFECTING TRUST CREATION AND ADMINISTRATION, 15, 
(3d ed. 2014); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 1654 (9th ed. 2009). 
. 
52. Some authorities suggest some departure from this enumeration. see Lo-
renzetti, supra note 1 at 146–50.  
53. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 51. 
54. Debra Baker, Island Castaway, 84 A.B.A. J. 54, 54–56, (1998). 
55. See FREDERICK J. TANSILL, Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Non-Tax Is-
sues, 421 A.L.I.-A.B.A. Continuing Legal Education (2007), available at 
http://files.alicle.org/thumbs/datastorage/skoobesruoc/pdf/CN035_chapter_11_thu
mb.pdf. 
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can such dispositions be made on the beneficiary’s behalf or 
recognized by the trustee;56 
5. an anti-disclosure clause, providing that the trust beneficiary 
retains no right to demand or request that the trustee make 
specific disclosures regarding trust properties, holdings, or 
administrative affairs, either to the beneficiary or to others 
acting on her behalf;57 
6. a duress clause, which, 
 prohibits the trustee from making any discretionary dis-
tributions of trust property to any party under circum-
stances, and 
 requires the foreign or “primary” trustee to remove the 
settlor as Co-Trustee (where such an appointment has 
been made), under any circumstances where the foreign 
trustee, in its sole judgment, determines that the benefi-
ciary has been subject to any form of coercion or com-
pulsion, legal, judicial, or otherwise, in regard to any 
matter affecting or affected by the property held by or 
administration of the trust, making it “impossible” for 
the trustee to return trust assets to the beneficiary, even 
when (and especially if) the beneficiary is under a court 
order to do so;58 
7. an ambulation (“flee” or “flight”) clause, specifying that the 
trust’s domicile may be changed to any other jurisdiction at 
the sole discretion of the foreign trustee, either by relocation 
of the trustee or by appointment of an alternate or “emergen-
cy” trustee domiciled in the new jurisdiction, in the event that 
the duress clause becomes operable or in the event that politi-
cal or legal action, acts of war or insurrection, or under any 
other event or circumstance that the trustee(s) determine(s) to 
threaten the operation or legal validity of the trust in its origi-
nal situs;59 and, 
 
56. Restatement Third of Trusts, § 58 (2001); Christopher Paul, Innovation or 
a Race to the Bottom? Trust “Modernization” in New Hampshire, 7 PIERCE L. 
REV. 353, 357–58 (2009). 
57. LAWRENCE, supra note 15, pt. I § G. 
58. Lorenzetti, supra note 1, 146–47. 
59. Id. at 147–9; ROB LAMBERT, CUBA CLAUSE & DEFINITION OF EVENT 
OF DURESS, http://www.assetprotectiontraining.com/cuba-clause-definition-event-
duress (last visited Nov. 11, 2014). 
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8. the appointment of a trust Protector, whose duty it is to over-
see the trustee and veto the trustee’s actions if necessary (of-
ten the settlor is appointed to fill this office as well).60 
A number of other items and techniques appurtenant to the trust doc-
ument(s) are routinely interwoven with the above elements in order to en-
hance each FAPT Plan’s unique operating character and slate of purported 
benefits.  This can effectively make a particularized FAPT Plan difficult, if 
not impossible, to replicate without expropriation of proprietary 
knowledge.  Such appurtenances may include methods and instructions for 
surviving contempt orders arising from the “impossibility” defense,61 plans 
for effective (yet informal) control of adverse trustees (should self-
settlement be eschewed or co-trusteeship adopted) through the use of “let-
ters of wishes”62 and similar mechanisms.  They may also include struc-
tured contingency and fund distribution plans in cases where (a) flight or 
trustee replacement clauses must be actuated, or (b) contempt orders must 
be willingly sustained as part of the plan’s overall strategy,63 which are 
intended to minimize the potentially negative external effects of a trust’s 
indenture. 
As this suggests, the task before a Planner may often be viewed as one 
of actually inviting, while concurrently massaging and forfending, a series 
of conflicts that inhere between competing legal systems and their stated 
policy objectives.  This requires a Planner’s honed capacity to select, dis-
card, and blend the distinguishing elements of an FAPT indenture into a 
singular, comprehensive Plan that; (a) provides for security of capital; (b) 
allows a client beneficiary ease of access to and/or use of capital within a 
context of economic substance sufficient to prevent findings of sham trans-
actions; while (c) synergistically supporting associated investment pro-
grams, operating plans of going ventures, and contingency plans for 
principals; (d) without benefit of any standardized legal tables or other 
 
60. Baker, supra note 54; LAWRENCE, supra note 15; see Jerald R. Breit-
enstine v. Nancy L. Breitenstine, 62 P.3d 587 (Wyo. 2003); see also Federal Trade 
Commission v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d, 2001 WL 583100, 1228 (9th 
Cir. 1999), passim. 
61. See FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228; In re Stephan Jay 
Lawrence v. Alan L. Goldberg, 279 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002). 
62. See Tansill, supra note 55 for examples of this type of planning. 
63. Such planning is suggested in, e.g., Richard Lewis, Comment, The For-
eign Irrevocable Life Insurance Trust as Asset Protection: Potential for Abuse and 
Suggestions for Reform, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 613, 632 (2003); James M. Duggan, In 
re Lawrence – Not Exactly Shawshank Redemption, But another Great Tale of 
Patience and Hope, THE WEALTH PRESERVATION INSTITUTE, 
http://www.thewpi.org/?a=PG:816 (last visited Nov. 13, 2014). 
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authorities with which to consult.  It is the rarity of the accumulated insight 
and particular skill set necessary to achieve these ends that may make par-
ticularized FAPT models difficult for others to duplicate by fair and legiti-
mate means. 
D. Positive and Negative Know-How 
Often, the essential matter of a Planner’s trade secret need not be 
found in the direct objects and terms specified within a Planning model.  
Rather, it may simply lie in the know-how necessary to develop that model, 
subsequently encoded within the body of the Plans derived from it.  Know-
how itself may be classified as a trade secret, as well as any prescriptive 
method of applying that know-how to a given task, object, or function.64  
Mere knowledge of how best to arrange pre-existing, readily available ele-
ments to achieve a desired effect may itself comprise a viable trade secret, 
as may the mere knowledge of the sources from which those elements are 
available.65  As such, the unique know-how required to produce FAPT 
Plans, including the knowledge of which jurisdictions’ laws may be in-
voked in concert with others to achieve certain beneficial effects, may 
comprise a protectable trade secret. 
There is also the element of negative know-how, the substance of 
which may qualify for trade secrecy under the UTSA and Restatement 
(Third) of Unfair Competitions’ definitions.66  For example, a Planner’s 
knowledge of what jurisdictions to avoid in order to attain the prescribed 
goals of a Plan, or what forms or terms to avoid in the jurisdiction(s) se-
lected, may prove as valuable to a Planner and her clients as the positive 
knowledge of what content to put into the Plan.  For Planners who do busi-
ness in states where the UTSA governs trade secrecy claims, the negative 
know-how components of an FAPT Plan may be of vital substance. 
 
64. Schulenberg v. Signatrol, Inc., 212 N.E. 2d 865, 866 (Ill. 1965).  
65. See Water Services, Inc. v. Tesco Chemicals, Inc., 410 F.2d 163, 165 (5th 
Cir. 1969). 
66. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 1, cmt. 
(1985); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR Competition § 39, cmt. e (1995). Con-
versely, since the Restatement of Torts’ definition includes the use requirement, it 
effectively excludes negative know-how from trade secrecy. RESTATEMENT 
(FIRST) OF Torts § 757, cmt. b (1939). 
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IV.  MAINTAINING CONFIDENTIALITY: PRESERVING AND DEFENDING 
THE TRADE SECRET 
One of the primary practical arguments against trade secrecy for any 
form of financial or organizational planning is that it may prove difficult to 
prevent essentially innocent or untraceable disclosure.  Whenever a Plan-
ning client shows the content and terms of a Plan to an outside consultant 
or advisor, the consulted professional will surely add that information to his 
collective knowledgebase.  That professional, in turn, may use the infor-
mation contained in the Plan to assist other clients in the future, without the 
Planner ever receiving notice of the fact.  If this knowledge is subsequently 
transmitted to third parties without any notice or indication of the original 
claim of trade secrecy, the original Planner may have no recourse against 
these parties other than pursuing injunctive relief against them.  The diffi-
culty and expense in attempting to prove the chain of transmission by 
which these third parties came into possession of the Planner’s confidential 
information may prove enormous, making it impractical for the Planner to 
enforce her rights in court.  Similarly, any time the Plan is fully discovered 
or disclosed in a judicial proceeding against one of its principals, the full 
terms of the Plan may become a matter of public record.  These and other 
developments could compromise the confidentiality of the Plan’s infor-
mation, eliminating any trade secrecy it may have had. 
These concerns may be partly allayed through the use of the restrictive 
captions noted, supra.  Similar devices have been held to extend the protec-
tion of confidentiality beyond the primary relationship of the original 
communicant and recipient of the information, imposing legal restraints on 
any third parties who might wish to use the information without permission 
or privilege to do so.67  Of course, this provides no practical relief against 
third parties who receive Plan content orally without being apprised of its 
confidential nature. 
As for possible disclosure through judicial proceedings, it should be 
remembered that one of the primary characteristics that sets a skilled Plan-
ner apart from others is her ability to render Plans that ensure discreet, low-
profile operations, avoiding the attention of creditors and other claimants.  
A skilled Planner may never find his Plans substantially disclosed pursuant 
to a lawsuit or other action, simply because their principals may never be 
brought into court.  Beyond this, those collateral or corollary elements not 
included in the indenture, attachments, or exhibits to an FAPT may not be 
 
67. Data General Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, Inc., 357 A.2d 105, 
109, 111 (Del. Ch. 1975). 
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immediately discoverable, and any trade secrets they contain may survive 
the disclosures mandated in a judicial proceeding. 
Ultimately, one must remember that while trade secrecy may be per-
petual and indefinite,68 it is not necessarily permanent.69  Trade secrets are 
eventually ceded back to the industries that spawned them.70  A trade secret 
may be only briefly transitory, almost evanescent, yet still be wholly legit-
imate as a protected property.  The protections of trade secrecy for financial 
or organizational Plans may or may not be long-lived, but their duration 
may be sufficient to enhance the economic value that Planners derive from 
their services, making them still worthwhile.  If a Planner is concerned by 
the potentially fleeting nature of trade secrecy, however, the pursuit of 
other protections may seem more desirable. 
V.ALTERNATIVES TO TRADE SECRECY: COPYRIGHT AND PATENT 
Copyright appears to be inviable as a means of protecting FAPT Plans 
as IP.  The publication requirements of copyright would publicly disclose 
the workings of FAPT Plans, making them accessible to any persons who 
might wish to copy them.  A copyright protects only the expression of ideas 
or concepts fixed within tangible media of expression, not the ideas or con-
cepts themselves.71  Thus, the very act of copyrighting would make the 
ideas and concepts within a Planning model publicly accessible to all who 
may wish to use them without using the same expressive medium, thus 
conferring to the Planner no continuing rights or interest in that information 
itself. 
Patents, on the other hand, appear to present a more complex yet (to 
the most optimistic) potentially more viable option.  The world of patent 
law is presently in a state of flux concerning the patentability of business 
strategies and methods.  Until quite recently, a body of emerging case law 
seemed to confirm the idea that business strategies and methods comprised 
patentable subject matter.  This was most directly expressed by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. 
 
68. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) 
(quoting United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186–87 
(1933)); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231–32 (1964). 
69. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 498–99 (1974). 
70. See id. at 490 for a discussion of the “ripeness-of-time” with a recitation 
of sources. 
71. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). 
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Signature Financial Group, Inc., in which the court ultimately deemed a 
system designed for implementing an investment structure patentable.72 
State Street Bank effectively expanded the scope of patentable subject 
matter beyond that dealing with ordinary industrial processes and tangible 
devices, by specifically including business methods as patentable process-
es.73  Following State Street Bank, creators of strategic business methods 
began filing a “proliferation” of applications for U.S. patents to protect 
their works.74  The tendency to patent these items became so pronounced 
that some analysts believed it had precipitated something of a crisis, owing 
to the “avalanche of business method and financial transaction applications 
moving through the [U.S. patent] system.”75  The American Bar Associa-
tion found this matter so compelling that it formed a special Tax Strategy 
Patenting Task Force specifically to address the issue.76 
Prior to State Street Bank, there had been a judicially-created “busi-
ness method” exception that excluded business methods and strategies from 
the field of patentable subject matter.77  The appellate court in State Street 
took careful pains to reject that exception, calling it ill-conceived in a 
judgment crafted with the specific intent to “lay [it] to rest.”78  Broadly 
interpreted, State Street instructed that the only requirement for the patent-
ability of business methods is that they “produce a useful, concrete, and 
tangible result,”79 even if that result is as insubstantial and ephemeral as “a 
final share price momentarily fixed for recording and reporting purposes.”80  
This would seem to encompass methods that preserve the core value of 
assets from taxes and creditor claims to at least the same extent that it 
would methods for establishing share prices, which suggests that FAPT 
 
72. 149 F.3d 1368, 1377 (1998). 
73. LINDA M. BEALE , Is Bilski Likely the Final Word on Tax Strategy Pa-
tents? Coherence Matters, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 110, 110 
(2009). 
74. ANISH PARIKH, The Proliferation of Tax Strategy Patents: Has Patent-
ing Gone Too Far?, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 202, 204 (2007). 
75. BEALE, supra note 73. 
76. Press Release, American Bar Ass’n, Tax Strategy Patenting Task Force, 
http://apps.americanbar.org/tax/press/2006/patentingtaxstrategies.doc (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2014). 
77. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 
1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 1373 (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
(en banc)); BEALE, supra note 73. 
80. State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373. 
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Plans would be just as susceptible of patent protections as share-pricing 
methods. 
Events since State Street Bank, however, seem to call into question the 
patentability of certain business methods (which would include the formu-
lation of FAPT Plans).  Revisiting the issue of business methods as patent-
able subject matter in In re Bilski, the Federal Circuit, without formally 
overturning its decision in State Street Bank, rejected claims that a business 
model and method of hedging risk in the commodity and energy markets 
comprised patentable subject matter.81  The Supreme Court affirmed the 
Federal Circuit’s implicit reversal of its own position in State Street Bank 
(though deploying different reasoning than that expressed in the appellate 
decision), finding that the financial models considered in Bilski merely 
represented the incorporation of abstract ideas, and were therefore barred 
from patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 101.82  Though not conclusive, this 
affirmation of the judicially created “abstract idea” exception suggested 
that organizational models designed to minimize or eliminate one’s risk of 
capital loss due to creditor action or taxation, which are seemingly just as 
abstract as specific designs to reduce risk of capital loss in markets, might 
now be found unpatentable. 
A clearer, more resolute determination regarding the patentability of 
financial planning processes recently appeared to be at hand, with the Su-
preme Court granting certiorari to review the Federal Circuit’s decision in 
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International.83  Many hoped the Supreme Court 
would use this case as an instrument to define more clearly the limits of 
method patentability, since the Court’s willingness to hear arguments ap-
peared substantially motivated by its desire to finish the task it undertook in 
Bilski.  The Court’s cursory, indecisive treatment in Bilski had failed to 
provide adequate definition to the exclusionary limits of patentability, leav-
ing it difficult (if not impossible) to understand precisely what factors and 
conditions render an idea too abstract to be patentable.84  This issue begged 
for clearer resolution, and the Supreme Court seemed poised to provide it 
in Alice.  In rendering its decision, however, the Supreme Court did little to 
clear the muddied waters in which business method patents are submerged. 
The patents at issue in Alice direct claims to a very broad and funda-
mentally abstract idea, namely, the notion of using intermediaries to reduce 
settlement risk in financial transactions.  As in Bilski, the Alice Court found 
 
81. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 960, 963–64 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
82. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 609, 611–12 (2010). 
83. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S.Ct. 734, 735 (order granting cert.). 
84. Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 1315, 1316 
(2011). 
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that the subject patents disclose only fundamental ideas constituting basic 
abstractions underlying longstanding practices, and thus fail to qualify as 
patent-eligible subject matter.  Drawing substantially upon its prior deci-
sion in Mayo Collaborative Services. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., the Alice 
Court articulated a two-step analytical framework to determine patent eli-
gibility of methods under Section 101: 
1. determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one or 
more patent-ineligible concepts (i.e. laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas); if so, 
2. determine whether the elements of the subject claim or claims, 
either individually or in an ordered combination, incorporate 
an inventive step comprising an element or combination of el-
ements sufficient to ensure that the practice of the patented 
method would amount to something significantly more than a 
patent on the ineligible concept itself.85 
In pronouncing this framework, the Alice Court declined its opportuni-
ty to provide clear definitional guidelines governing the patentability of 
methods.  The framework articulated in Alice fails to provide specific 
standards or criteria by which to assess patentability, and questions remain 
as to how much “more” an inventor must add to an underlying abstraction 
in order for a business method to constitute patentable subject matter.  
While the Court noted that the plaintiffs in Alice did not do “enough” (ital-
ics in the original) to transform an underlying abstract idea into a patent-
eligible invention, it failed to state what transformative substance or meas-
ure would have been sufficient to do so.  Thus, Alice still leaves us with no 
threshold test and advances no predictable basis upon which to make a 
reliable determination of method patentability.  In taking guidance from 
Alice, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office recognizes that the basic in-
quiries to determine subject matter eligibility remain just as ambiguous as 
they were formerly under the Bilski guidance.86 
The only real advance made by Alice seems to be that it closes a po-
tential loophole around Bilski, by blocking generic implementations of 
 
85. Alice Corp., 134 S.Ct. at 2355.; see Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prome-
theus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1297–98 (2012). 
86. Memorandum from Andrew H. Hirshfeld, Deputy Comm’r for Patent Ex-
amination Policy, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Preliminary Exami-
nation Instructions in View of the Supreme Court Decision in Alice Corporation 
Ply. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al., (June 25, 2014), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/announce/alice_pec_25jun2014.pdf .  
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abstract concepts.87  Though it may seem a minor point, this lone advent 
may foreclose upon a number of business method patents that fail to dis-
close unique technological innovations governing a strict implementation 
of their underlying concepts.  Anticipation of this doctrinal refinement may 
have already affected the outcome of a once much heralded case, Finance-
ware, Inc. v. UBS Fin. Servs., which was filed in the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York during the course of Alice’s 
litigation.88  The plaintiff in this lawsuit, Financeware, accused UBS Finan-
cial Services, a major international financial planning and advising firm, of 
infringing two financial advising patents that Financeware had received in 
2009 and 2010.89  The subject patents cover processes designed to facilitate 
the objective assessment of a client’s financial goals, as well as a claimed 
proprietary model to determine the best means by which to achieve them.90  
The firm PIEtech, Inc., which authored and distributed the allegedly in-
fringing software used by UBS, was permitted to join the suit upon its own 
motion as an intervening party.91  The patents at issue in Financeware ap-
pear somewhat parallel in scope to the patents rejected in Bilski and Alice.  
The claims of at least one of these patents exceed the software, code, and/or 
digital processing systems used in a financial advising practice, and seem 
to encompass the information and assessments underlying the very process 
of advising.92 
This litigation wrought great alarm among industry analysts, who 
feared that if this suit were successful, it would give the United States Pa-
tent and Trademark Office dispensation to grant patent monopolies on not 
just “the core tenets of . . . financial planning” but “the financial planning 
process itself.”93  The potential success of Financeware in this action 
threatened to reduce the financial planning world to a virtual fiefdom, by 
 
87. Jonathon C. Anderson, Supreme Court Invalidates Business Method Pa-
tent: What You Need to Know About Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, FAEGRE BAKER 
DANIELS, (July 2, 2014), http://www.faegrebd.com/21765. 
88. Complaint, Financeware, Inc. v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 11 CIV 5503, 
2011 WL 3565794 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2011). 
89. Id. 
90. Karen DeMasters, Lawsuit Against UBS Has Far-Reaching Implications 
For Advisors, FINANCIAL ADVISOR, Aug. 11, 2011, available at 
http://www.fa-mag.com/news/lawsuit-against-ubs-has-far-reaching-implications-
for-advisors-8017.html. 
91. Financeware, Inc. v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 11 Civ. 5503, 2011 WL 
6092311, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2011).  
92. U.S. Patent No. 7,765,138 (filed Dec. 15, 2004); U.S. Patent 7,562,040 
(filed July 27, 2007). 
93. DeMasters, supra note 90. 
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effectively conferring exclusive rights to private parties to “own the finan-
cial planning process and . . . charge a tariff for its use.”94 
The parties eventually settled this action in November 2012.95  Upon 
the settlement’s announcement, the financial planning community breathed 
a collective sigh of relief.96  While the parties concluded and maintained 
their settlement in confidence, conspicuous elements and absences in pub-
lic reports of their accord suggest that Financeware held little hope of being 
able to enforce its patents.  Granted, the defendants in the suit seem to have 
agreed to drop their challenges to the validity of Financeware’s patents.97  
UBS, however, continued to use the disputed financial advising software 
and systems without interruption, and PIEtech suffered no apparent imped-
ance of its operations, adding substantially to both its client list and com-
mercial volume during and after the litigation.98  This continuation and 
expansion of the defendants’ trade occurred even though the parties report-
ed no licensing activity between the litigants, and the software remains in 
distribution with no visible sub-licenses attached.99  This suggests that the 
litigants may have anticipated the subtle strengthening of Bilski, with the 
implicit result that Financeware essentially conceded to its opponents. 
The denouement of Financeware holds great significance for the po-
tential patentability of FAPT Plans.  It suggests that patents claiming spe-
cialized knowledge and methods of assessing information and 
recommending patterns of action may be difficult to enforce going forward, 
even assuming the issuance of such patents after Alice.  While Finance-
ware did involve patents disclosing computerized implementation, the 
broader issues underlying that case place it virtually on all fours in relation 
to FAPT Planning and analysis.  At least one of Financeware’s patents 
contains claims directed to a financial planning approach alone, disclosing 
methods and formulas designed to achieve optimal financial and organiza-
tional outcomes without reference or recourse to any specific mechanical 
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device or other tangible expression of art.  This gives the Financeware 
patents a common basis with those prospectively sought by Planners.  That 
this plaintiff appears to have felt incapable of compelling alleged infringers 
to cede appreciable ground suggests that patents may not afford workable 
protection for Planning methods or models, absent their disclosure of a 
novel technological means of implementation. 
Following Alice, the quest to resolve the question of business method 
patentability may now be pursued through other cases, such as Ultramer-
cial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC.100 The patent at issue in Ultramercial directs claims 
primarily to a business method that merely comprises a linkage between 
product sales and sponsored advertising over the Internet.  That patent was 
initially ruled invalid by a federal district court on the basis of its claims 
directing to mere abstractions, but that decision was subsequently reversed 
by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.101  A petition for a writ of 
certiorari was filed following the Federal Circuit’s reversal, to which the 
Supreme Court responded by vacating the appellate decision and remand-
ing the case for further consideration in light of Alice.102  The claims in the 
Ultramercial patent appear equally broad to those repudiated in Alice and 
Bilski, and thus the patent may well be invalidated upon remand. 
Should Ultramercial somehow produce a favorable outcome for its 
plaintiffs, it may commend patents as a viable means of protecting FAPT 
Plans as IP.  Regardless of Ultramercial and its outcome, however, there is 
an important exception to patentability that would inalienably render the 
discrete tax planning components within an FAPT Plan vulnerable.  The 
question of patent protection for tax planning elements has been negatively 
resolved by statute, leaving a Planner with no prospect to achieve anything 
more than partial patent protection for her methods.  Section 14 of the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011 (“AIA”) disallows the patenta-
bility of tax strategies, in whatever context they may arise.  Sec. 14 states in 
pertinent part: 
TAX STRATEGIES DEEMED WITHIN THE PRIOR ART. 
IN GENERAL.—For purposes of evaluating an invention under section 
102 or 103 of title 35, United States Code, any strategy for reducing, 
avoiding, or deferring tax liability, whether known or unknown at the 
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time of the invention or application for patent, shall be deemed insuffi-
cient to differentiate a claimed invention from the prior art.103 
The AIA, however, seems to leave the patentability of severable, non-
tax strategy elements of FAPT Plans untouched.  Succeeding language in 
Sec. 14 preserves the patentability of non-tax strategy elements contained 
within financial management plans by excluding them from the preclusive 
ambit of Sec. 14(a): 
( c ) EXCLUSIONS – This section does not apply to that part of an in-
vention that – 
. . . .  
(3) is a method . . . or system used solely for financial management, to 
the extent that it is severable from any tax strategy or does not limit the 
use of any tax strategy by any taxpayer or tax advisor.104 
Thus, a Planner who integrates tax planning elements into her methods 
may achieve only partial protection via patent, regardless of any future 
judicial treatments. 
In the ambiguous wake of the Alice and Bilski decisions, and with the 
pendant uncertainty of Ultramercial, it is not clear whether even the non-
tax strategy portions of FAPT Plans may be successfully preserved via 
patents.  This holistic uncertainty, combined with the expansive disclosures 
required by the patent application process, may render the pursuit of pa-
tents unfavorable as a device to protect FAPT Plans.  As such, trade secre-
cy seems to present the most viable means presently available for Planners 
to protect their planning methods and models as IP. 
VI.  POLICY CONCERNS – SHOULD TRADE SECRECY BE ALLOWED FOR 
FAPT PLANS AND OTHER FORMS OF FINANCIAL PLANNING? 
There are legitimate questions as to whether allowing the protection of 
FAPT Plans as trade secrets would promote sound public policy objectives.  
Some arguments against offering such protections parallel those generally 
posited against the issuance of patents for methods of tax, legal, investing, 
and financial planning.  Critics contend that the availability of IP protection 
generally creates a chilling effect on advisory practices and inhibits the 
dissemination of information by attorneys and other advising professionals 
to their clients.105 The potential of lawsuits for unintentional infringement 
is considered generally unhealthy for the operating environment in advising 
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industries, in that it curtails the ability of professionals to advise their cli-
ents freely.106  An infringement lawsuit need not target or immediately 
affect individual advisors in order for them to begin harboring reservations 
about applying the full weight of their knowledge and resources to a cli-
ent’s needs.  The mere news or threat of lawsuits based on IP claims could 
produce a chilling effect, by increasing potential liabilities and thus raising 
the cost of doing business in financial and advising industries substantial-
ly.107 
Similarly, allowing trade secret protection for professional planning 
and advising models may result in professional advisors and consultants 
being inhibited from freely offering opinions regarding any plans they may 
be asked to review.  Advisors may become concerned that by incorporating 
treatments of proposed plan elements into their professional work product, 
they might violate the claimed confidential interests of a third party.  This 
could potentially lessen the general availability of counsel to clients, seri-
ously impacting the important policy objective of ensuring access to sound 
legal and professional advice.  It might also impair an advisor’s ability to 
render effective advice in her ongoing practice, as she may be reluctant to 
add the specific treatments and critiques of the terms she encounters in a 
protected plan to the body of knowledge she imparts to others in the future. 
Contrarily, extending trade secret protection to professional advising 
models may actually work to expand the potential for optimization of 
standard advising techniques.  Such protections would enhance the incen-
tives to perform vigorous exploration and analyses of case law, tax codes, 
regulatory law and statutes, and other authorities bearing upon an advisor’s 
practice.  The proceeds of these initiatives would tend to expand the overall 
knowledgebase available to those involved in the advisor’s field, resulting 
in a net expansion of art within that industry.  It must be remembered that 
trade secrets are eventually absorbed into the industries in which they arise, 
and arguably tend to become part of the standard art more quickly and 
readily than patented subject matter.108  At that point, the fund of 
knowledge freely available to society will be greater than it would have 
been had trade secrecy not been available to provide an initial incentive to 
individual research and initiative. 
These concerns exemplify a key point underlying the disparity and po-
tential conflict between patent and trade secrecy law.  Patent law expresses 
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a strong federal policy favoring the disclosure of innovation.109  As an in-
centive to this disclosure, patent law offers a legal monopoly to applicants 
for a fixed period of time, during which the art of the patent is fully dis-
closed and available to stimulate further innovation within the subject in-
dustry.  Trade secrecy, on the other hand, actually requires that innovations 
not be disclosed to the public at any time during the effective life of the 
secret.  While courts have found that the policy imperatives underlying 
patent and trade secret law do not necessarily conflict,110 the fact remains 
that these bodies of law impel individuals toward opposite behaviors and 
effects. 
Hence, if making innovative financial and organizational planning in-
formation more readily and publicly available is a top priority, then sound 
policy would promote patent protection as a complement to trade secrecy.  
Alternatively, if granting statutory monopolies on any part of what may be 
viewed as an essentially public practice seems counterproductive or unfair, 
a policy endorsing trade secrecy alone may be preferable.  A third approach 
would be to deny both patent and trade secret protection to all financial and 
organizational advising methods, since the negative consequences of allow-
ing proprietary interests to dominate these fields would outweigh any pos-
sible incentives to invent that either patents or trade secrecy can provide.  
The optimal balance of policy interests and objectives relative to IP protec-
tions for professional advising industries has yet to be struck, leaving these 
and other policy questions unresolved. 
A. FAPT Planning and Tax and Creditor Rights Policies 
As they relate to tax effects, policy discussions regarding FAPTs 
comprise an extension of the overarching, systemic dialogue regarding tax 
policy itself.  A policy of granting trade secrecy protection to Planning 
techniques effectively provides an incentive to form FAPTs for the purpose 
of tax avoidance.  Thus, the basic issue here becomes whether, by provid-
ing an incentive to craft and implement sophisticated Planning models that 
may facilitate the avoidance of taxes, a policy of granting trade secret pro-
tection to Planning models would harm or hinder society at large. 
Some argue that by encouraging taxpayers to resort to foreign lands 
and legal systems to avoid domestic taxes, FAPTs and similar forms of 
Planning create a deleterious draw upon the U.S. tax base and encourage 
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tax evasion.111  For this reason, many decry Planners’ efforts as essentially 
unethical, or even immoral or illicit.112  Some see all forms of offshore 
planning as fundamentally indefensible in light of their purported drain on 
tax coffers, which may exceed 250 billion dollars annually worldwide.113 
Alternatively, some economists feel that tax–saving mechanisms that 
divert monetary gains away from economic tax loss have a net beneficial 
effect on the overall economy.  Their studies indicate that the net 
deadweight economic loss caused by governmental system extraction via 
the income tax exceeds fifty percent of all revenues taken.114  Net 
deadweight economic losses tend to increase as implemental measures 
make it more difficult for taxpayers to avoid income taxation, lowering the 
overall efficiency of the economic system.  This owes to the fact that as 
anti-tax avoidance policies make it increasingly difficult to circumvent 
taxation, the greater the costs imposed by the system in association with tax 
avoidance, and correspondingly, the greater the costs that taxpayers are 
forced to bear in order to achieve it.115 
Systems and apparatuses that decrease net dead weight economic loss-
es caused by taxation are ultimately beneficial, as they convert substantial 
portions of those losses to net monetary holdings in the domestic market.116  
They increase the private capital resources of the U.S. economy,117 making 
it more efficient.  This furthers the interests and effects of sound economic 
policy, so that any effort to reduce or remove the incentives given to Plan-
ners to assist their clients in avoiding taxes may actually be counterproduc-
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tive to the economic interests of society as a whole.118  This seems to con-
firm a foundational tenet lying at the heart of trade secret policy and juris-
prudence; namely, that trade secret protection should reduce the 
squandering of resources that attends extravagant or excessive steps to 
preserve one’s self-interest.  Ultimately, offshore tax avoidance mecha-
nisms act as a check on the excesses of domestic tax policies, and help 
drive better tax policies in high-income nations.119  Similar observations 
and effects apply to other loss avoidance aspects of Planning, such as insu-
lation from questionable claims and allegations brought by potential credi-
tors and litigants. 
B. FAPT Planning and Foreign Policy 
Hosting FAPTs and other asset protection vehicles typically provides 
a valuable source of income and economic stimulus to domiciliary jurisdic-
tions.120  By encouraging the development of offshore financial industries, 
Planners may help ease local financial burdens and taxation levels within 
these jurisdictions (often dubbed “tax havens”),121 and thus raise their 
standards of living.122  In cases where foreign policies deliberately harm 
offshore financial industries, the local financial effects may prove disas-
trous,123 especially since conditional factors often make it impossible for an 
offshore financial center to cease its reliance upon offshore formation and 
servicing revenues.124  Beyond this, offshore financial centers provide 
meaningful checks on the magnitude of global socio-political abuses by 
giving threatened or repressed people a safe capital outlet and mechanism 
for fleeing persecution.125  Thus, Planners may help to preserve and ease 
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access to personal liberty in the world, and U.S. policies should provide 
incentives for Planning activities. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
FAPT Planning models may be fitting objects for trade secret protec-
tion.  Where the critical factors of uniqueness or originality, economic val-
ue, reasonable steps to establish and maintain secrecy, and insularity from 
common industry knowledge are present, Planning models satisfy the re-
quirements to be afforded protection as trade secrets under the law.  The 
alternative dynamics and interplay between trade secrecy and patent protec-
tion have yet to be defined for financial planning models in general, but 
trade secrecy appears to present a viable IP option for Planners regardless 
of whether FAPT Plans are ultimately found to be patentable.  While policy 
concerns and analyses remain mixed, legitimate policy goals and impera-
tives exist that support providing the incentive of trade secrecy protection 
to Planning activities.  On these bases, trade secrecy protection should be 
recognized for those Planners who take the requisite steps to protect their 
specific FAPT models, as it would with any other body of formulated in-
formation. 
 
